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| it reads like a spy novelIt is definitely more interesting of a read than I was expecting. Even more so, I think it illustrates that a lot of the lack of making data accessible is by design. It’s unfortunate because it is really hurting the dealers they claim to be helping. | DMS companies want to ensure data security and integrityI would argue this. As a vendor, I can tell you we’ve been the recipient of leaked dealer data coming from thousands of dealerships (yes, thousands). These leaks and 100% of incidences them have come through the CRM’s “certified interfaces.” The lack of security and protocols in these interfaces has been alarming. Pages 37-38 call out this lack of security and demonstrate the real objective was to make money and that security was the marketing angle to limit competition and increase revenue.“Plaintiffs cite evidence that SecurityFirst was considered a marketing campaign designed to drive up 3PA revenue, rather than a bona fide security effort. (See id.) For instance, an internal email from CDK’s Global Security Officer, Josh Sowers, criticized the company for launching its initiative “where our security sucks and is no where near industry best practices.” (DRPSOF ¶ 122.) In another email, Sowers complained that CDK had “[n]o product security strategy and Yet we want to talk security to sell products.” (Id.) Sowers believed CDK was “going to market way too soon” and could not “answer the fundamental question of what is more secure.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also note skepticism on the part of some vendors and dealers about whether the new measures were genuinely adopted for security reasons. (Id. ¶ 125; see also id.¶ 126 (evidence from 2006 to 2013 that CDK employees believed Reynolds’s similar security measures were motivated by financial rather than security concerns); id. ¶ 128 (evidence CDK relaxed security measures for dealers whose DMS contracts would be up for renegotiation soon).)”
| it reads like a spy novel
It is definitely more interesting of a read than I was expecting. Even more so, I think it illustrates that a lot of the lack of making data accessible is by design. It’s unfortunate because it is really hurting the dealers they claim to be helping.
| DMS companies want to ensure data security and integrity
I would argue this. As a vendor, I can tell you we’ve been the recipient of leaked dealer data coming from thousands of dealerships (yes, thousands). These leaks and 100% of incidences them have come through the CRM’s “certified interfaces.” The lack of security and protocols in these interfaces has been alarming. Pages 37-38 call out this lack of security and demonstrate the real objective was to make money and that security was the marketing angle to limit competition and increase revenue.
“Plaintiffs cite evidence that SecurityFirst was considered a marketing campaign designed to drive up 3PA revenue, rather than a bona fide security effort. (See id.) For instance, an internal email from CDK’s Global Security Officer, Josh Sowers, criticized the company for launching its initiative “where our security sucks and is no where near industry best practices.” (DRPSOF ¶ 122.) In another email, Sowers complained that CDK had “[n]o product security strategy and Yet we want to talk security to sell products.” (Id.) Sowers believed CDK was “going to market way too soon” and could not “answer the fundamental question of what is more secure.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also note skepticism on the part of some vendors and dealers about whether the new measures were genuinely adopted for security reasons. (Id. ¶ 125; see also id.¶ 126 (evidence from 2006 to 2013 that CDK employees believed Reynolds’s similar security measures were motivated by financial rather than security concerns); id. ¶ 128 (evidence CDK relaxed security measures for dealers whose DMS contracts would be up for renegotiation soon).)”
